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The subject-matter of this article is the ‘systemacity of law’ concept and its methodological 
feedback. Continuing a series of articles on this subject, the author focuses on the internal 
rationality of claims about the systemic character of law. This rationality is embedded 
in the legal thinking of Modernity and reveals itself in the belief in the rational nature 
of law. According to this style of legal thinking, such internal rationality impedes law 
from being chaotically or randomly organized and structured. Therefore, law shall have 
a reasonably organized structure, even if in reality it does not have such a structure. In 
this way, the belief in an internal rationality of law transforms itself into the requirement 
for the rational organization of law. These two elements – belief in an internal rationality 
and the requirement of the rational organization of law – are the pillars of the dogmatic 
conception of law which was established in Begriffsjurisprudenz of the 19th century and 
which still holds sway over contemporary continental legal thinking.
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1. Introduction
In the following lines we will scrutinize whether there is any place in the legal 
sciences for the concept of systemacity, and will argue for a negative answer to this 
question. this criticism has already been articulated in several russian and English 
publications,1 and here we will revert to the analysis of the irrational character of 
this concept as applied to law. we assume, following Eugenio Bulygin and Carlos 
Alchourrón,2 that ‘systemacity’ is one of the ‘rational ideals’ of the legal thinking of 
Modernity. this ideal requires all law to be unified and rationally structured. At the 
same time, this ideal embodies the reflective belief that all law is unified and structured. 
the notion of a ‘system of law,’ in this perspective, pretends to be at the same time 
a modal requirement and a factual description. this results in an internal contradiction 
and triviality of this notion, but nonetheless makes it invulnerable to criticism as in the 
final account this notion is based on a rational belief (that law should be and already 
is unified and rationally structured) and not on positive knowledge. this belief  is 
omnipresent in discussions about the pretended systemic character of law.3
the systemic approach to law expresses the realistic vision of reality, albeit in 
quite a naive version, based on the assumption that the image of law we perceive is 
the ‘true’ reality of law. In other words, what we observe or perceive is identified with 
some concrete legal order that is empirically real and seemingly systemic. however, 
this in itself is a paradigm of the interpretation of reality – a certain image of law 
crafted by ideology, doctrine, and practice. It says that we do not need any special 
notions to act as intermediaries between the perception of the law as of an order, 
and reality to grasp it, because what we perceive as an order is already the order. 
thence, the paradigm of interpretation of reality dictates, or is interrelated with, 
the paradigm of facts.4 In continental legal doctrine, the concept of a ‘legal system’ 
1  See Mikhail Antonov, Legal Systems Integrity in Philosophy, National research university – higher school 
of Economics working Paper No. wP BrP 34/LAw/2014, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2420315> (accessed 
Jul. 27, 2015); idem, Some Reflections about Unity of Law and of Normative Systems, 5(2) Arts soc. sci. J. 
(2014), available at <http://www.omicsonline.com/open-access/some-reflections-about-unity-of-
law-and-of-normative-systems-2151-6200.100068.pdf> (accessed Jul. 28, 2015). doi:10.4172/2151-
6200.1000068
2  Carlos E. Alchourrón & Eugenio Bulygin, Normative systems 165–80 (springer 1971).
3  the discussion about the applicability of the ‘systemic approach’ or ‘systems theory’ (initially developed 
by Bertalanffy and other representatives of hard sciences), to law deserves special attention and does not 
fall within the scope of the present research. we have exposed our position on this matter in a russian 
publication (Антонов М.В. О системности права и «системных» понятиях в правоведении // 
Правоведение. 2014. № 1. С. 24-42 [Antonov M.V. O sistemnosti prava i ‘sistemnykh’ ponyatiyakh 
v pravovedenii // Pravovedenie. 2014. No. 1. s. 24–42 [Mikhail Antonov, On Systemacity of Law and on 
‘Systemic’ Notions in Legal Science, 2014(1) Legal studies 24-42]]), to which we address readers.
4  See Lidia rodak, Objectivity of Legal Facts from Semantic Point of View, 28(41) studies in Logic, grammar 
and rhetoric: Language, Culture, Meaning 127 (2012), available at <http://logika.uwb.edu.pl/studies/
index.php?page=search&vol=41> (accessed Jul. 28, 2015).
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constitutes the predominant paradigm of interpretation, which in turn indicates that 
law shall be described and interpreted as a whole. Even if this approach can appear 
intuitively correct within the continental legal paradigm,5 it remains basically devoid 
of any serious analytical evidence.
this enables us to reformulate the question about the objectivity of systemacity 
into questions about the objectivity of the meaning of systemacity and the objectivity 
of the interpretation of the pretended systemic characteristics of law. In the title of 
this paper, we utilize the term ‘phantasm’ in order to show the illusory nature of 
systemacity in law. the term ‘phantasm,’ as explained by gilles deleuze, generally 
refers to a simulation removed from the origin of social and historical experience. 
deleuze shows:
the affective charge with the phantasm is explained by the internal 
resonance whose bearers are the simulacra . . . As the simulacrum dismisses 
identity, speaks and is spoken, it takes hold at the same time of both seeing and 
is speaking and inspires both light and sound. It opens up to it difference and 
to all other differences. All simulacra rise to the surface, forming this mobile 
figure at the creation of the waves of intensity – an intense phantasm.6
on the one hand, the fact is that lawyers speak about the system of law, and 
on the other hand, the fact is that law is not a system, i.e. a consistent, irredundant 
and gapless normative entity. this is one of the principal dichotomies of law which 
legal philosophers try to circumvent via various metaphysical speculations. these 
speculations, as different as they can be, aim to demonstrate that even if (the) law7 
is not a system properly speaking, it is nevertheless a system in some other sense. 
when legal philosophers reiterate the alleged systemacity of law, they accumulate 
under this term various ideological postulates requiring that law as ‘the most visible 
symbol of social solidarity’8 shall regulate social life in a coherent, integral, ‘systemic’ 
way. A fallacy of this style of reasoning about systemacity is, as we will attempt to 
demonstrate, first of all due to the disregard of hume’s law which prohibits inferring 
any evaluative conclusion whatsoever from any set of factual premises, and vice 
5  In fact, this seems to be true only within the paradigm of the civil law. what concerns the common law, 
the customary law or the non-western legal orders based on religion or traditions, their ‘systemacity’ 
can be highly questionable and counterintuitive from the internal standpoint of the corresponding 
legal doctrines underpinning these legal orders.
6  gilles deleuze, the Logic of sense 298 (Mark Lester & Charles stivale, trans, Constantin V. Boundas, 
ed.) (Columbia university Press 1990).
7  For the present exposition we do not admit analytical difference between ‘law’ and ‘the law,’ although 
do not deny its pertinence for other purposes.
8  Emile durkheim, the division of Labor in society 24 (Macmillan 1984).
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versa.9 the proposition according to which law functions better being coherent 
and consistent proves nothing about the factual or normative dimensions of law 
which, as a rule, are quite far from meeting this requirement. that is why asserting 
that law functions ‘as a whole,’ ‘as a system,’ and arguing for the systemacity of law 
on this basis is justified (if ever!) only under the assumption of the contra-factual 
character of this assertion. As John Balkin wisely suggests, albeit in a more general 
perspective, ‘accounts of coherence in the social world, or in the actions and beliefs 
of others, are, at bottom, driven by our need to believe that our own beliefs are 
ordered, coherent, and rational.’10
2. The Systemacity Claim and the Structure of Law
the history of legal philosophy exemplifies that lawyers have an intrinsic incentive 
to understand law as a whole.11 this trend was often connected with speculative 
investigations into the nature of law, which implies rearrangement of the legal material 
(facts, texts, behavior acts . . .) around one or several pivotal axes in order to reconstruct 
law as a plausible object for definition. such a trend is quite explicable as law cannot 
be perceived without presupposing some kind of order between legal rules, which 
doctrinally is often translated through the catchphrase ‘systemacity of law.’ In this wide 
meaning we can understand ‘systemacity of law,’ together with Jeremy waldron, as
the quality of being systematic or of working as a system. the systemacity of 
a set of items refers to the fact that an operation performed on one member 
of the set will have an impact on other member too, and on their relations 
with one another.12
9  According to hume, ‘[i]n every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, 
that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of 
a god, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, 
that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is 
not connected with an ought, or an ought not. this change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last 
consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary 
that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what 
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are 
entirely different from it’ (david hume, A treatise of human Nature 469–70 (Clarendon Press 2000)).
10  John M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal 
Coherence, 103 yale L.J. 105, 117 (1993), available <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/
understandinglegalunderstanding.pdf> (accessed Jul. 28, 2015).
11  See Антонов М.В. Проблема системности в «Нормативных системах» // Конфликтология. 2011. 
№ 4. С. 109–117 [Antonov M.V. Problema sistemnosti v ‘Normativnykh sistemakh’ // konfliktologiya. 
2011. No. 4. s. 109–117 [Mikhail V. Antonov, The Problem of Systemacity in ‘Normative Systems,’ 
2011(4) Conflictology 109–17]].
12  Jeremy waldron, Transcendental Nonsense and System in the Law, 100 Colum. L. rev. 16, 20 (2000), available 
at <http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/persp/waldron-cohen.pdf> (accessed Jul. 28, 2015). In this sense, 
the term ‘systemacity’ can be used as interchangeable with such terms as ‘unity’ or ‘integrity.’
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this view allows for a priori intuitionist acceptance of systemacity which can be 
strong (acceptance as of a self-evident truth, e.g., ronald dworkin who sought to 
explain the nature of law as determined by the view of a subject making coherent 
arguments within the legal system) or weak (a fiction, as it was in the case of kelsen). 
this acceptance was modeled differently in various philosophical conceptions (unity 
of law can be thought in ontological, epistemic, axiological, narrative, intellectual, 
normative and other terms), within different legal philosophies (e.g., natural-law, 
positivist, realist doctrines).13 Evidently, a rule or a principle or any other element of 
the legal order (legal system) cannot, as such, exert any influence on other elements; 
because, for this effect, these elements would need actors (legal subjects) capable 
of producing changes through their (speech or behavioral) acts. Neither can an 
act of one legal subject have an automatic (predetermined, and in this sense 
‘systemic’) impact on acts of other subjects and affect their relations in this way, as 
any impact will finally depend on the mutual behavior of legal actors and on the 
reaction of legal practitioners. If ‘systemacity’ just translates the idea that any act 
influences other acts and in this way all the phenomena of this world are in a sort 
of interconnection, then we face the trivial theory of everything already voiced by 
ancient philosophers. ‘All things come out of the one and the one out of all things,’ 
as taught heraclitus. or, in the words of Marcus Aurelius,
[a]ll things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy; and there 
is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For things have been 
coordinated, and they combine to form the same universe. For there is one 
universe made up of all things . . .14
In this aspect, the systems theory could be true, but it is trivial and contributes 
nothing to understanding the nature or the structure of law. If the ‘systemacity of law’ 
is only about the statement ‘everything is connected with everything outside and 
inside of law,’ then this term is simply analytically empty. For example, the research 
undertaken on the forms of systemacity in legal theory by the Belgian legal scholars, 
Franşois ost and Michel van der kerchove, reveals that, as absolutely different 
13  on weak and strong senses of the term ‘system’ in legal studies see Mark van hoecke, Law as 
Communication 109–10 (hart Pub. 2002). one can also mention an important distinction between 
strong, modest and minimal objectivity of legal knowledge that can also reflect the degree of the 
assumed ‘systemacity’ of law. As Connie rosati suggests, strong objectivity sustains that our perception 
is fully independent of our subjectivity; modest version of objectivity admits that perception is partly 
dependent on the subject; and the minimal version of objectivity is based on the acceptance of the 
majority in a certain group (Connie s. rosati, Some Puzzles about Objectivity of Law, 23(3) Law and 
Philosophy 275 (2004)). In this triple aspect, law cannot be objective in the first, strong version – surely, 
provided that we accept that law is about social facts and not about transcendent realities.
14  Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 7.9.1, in 2 harvard Classics (P.F. Collier & son 1909).
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conceptions (Bulygin-Alchourrón, hart, kelsen, Perelman, Luhmann, wroblewski . . .)15 
can be characterized with the help of the common pointer ‘systemacity.’16 In the 
perspective of analytical philosophy, the term ‘systemacity’ can translate the idea that 
one linguistic unit can substitute another unit without changing the grammatical 
structure of a sentence. In the words of robert Cummins,
[s]ystem is said to exhibit systematicity if, whenever it can process a sentence 
‘s,’ it can process systematic variants of ‘s,’ where systematic variation is 
understood in terms of permuting constituents or (more strongly) substituting 
constituents of the same grammatical category.17
the term in question necessarily involves the idea of a preestablished harmony 
of law (even in a weak sense – ‘law must be something coherent’). this was patent 
already with the ancient philosophers who found that law is a part of the universe 
and therefore is subject to some universal regularities. More or less this idea of 
harmony also transpires in the writings of Nicolas Luhmann, talcott Parsons and 
other proponents of the theory of social systems, who saw ‘systemacity’ as a whole 
that emerges from interacting parts, providing selectable variations in the relation of 
elements and enabling new re-stabilizing structuration.18 however, this Luhmannian 
account of systemacity can be challenged with regard to law, its mechanism and 
structure. From the statements, ‘law can be described as something’ or ‘law should be 
understood as something,’ does not necessarily follow that law is always described as 
something or that it is always asserted that law should be understood as something. 
therefore, we can conclude that the idea of harmony in law remains analytically 
empty (anything can be put in the place of ‘something’) unless it is based on some 
preestablished values or precepts (e.g., theories like those of ronald dworkin, robert 
Alexy or Alexander Peczenik) which serve as an axiomatic base for construing 
law and its structure (‘system’). this assertion appears to be counterintuitive for 
lawyers trained to see and interpret law as a whole. such an interpretation does not 
15  Michel van der kerchove & François ost, Legal system between order and disorder (Iain stewart, 
trans.) (Clarendon Press 1994).
16  For the purposes of the present analysis we assume that depicturing law as a whole which embraces 
interconnected parts allows for different terms – ‘unity,’ ‘systemacity,’ ‘coherence,’ ‘integrity’ which 
equally translate the idea of being depending on the conceptual scheme they presuppose that 
there is a more or less strong harmony in law (between legal norms, propositions, principles, policies, 
values that are conventionally referred to as ‘law’), for the purposes of this presentation these terms 
can be used as interchangeable.
17  robert C. Cummins, Systematicity, 93(12) Journal of Philosophy 594 (1996). however, this perspective 
is not related with the set of ideas which is subsumed under the term of ‘systemacity of law,’ so that 
we can leave this aspect aside.
18  Niklas Luhmann, social systems 25 (John Bednarz, Jr. & dirk Baecker, trans.) (stanford university 
Press 1995).
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correspond to the real appearance of law – insofar as law consists of various sets of 
rules, principles which are not necessarily logically connected among themselves. 
Anyways, this logical connection is not a prima facie fact of law, but rather a result 
of the reconstruction of legal norms and principles by lawyers and legal scholars, as 
famously asserted by Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin. the asserted systemic 
reality of law can be contested on the grounds of immediate jural experience (to 
employ georges gurvitch’s term19). In this regard, it can be useful to use Chaïm 
Perelman’s ideas to distinguish the two kinds of appearances:
At first sight, appearance is nothing but a manifestation of reality: it is reality 
as it appears, as it presents itself to immediate experience. But when appearances 
are incompatible-when, for example, the oar is plunged into the water and 
appears broken to our sight and straight when we touch it, they cannot represent 
reality as it is, since reality is governed by the principle of noncontradiction and 
cannot simultaneously, and in the same relationship, have and not have a given 
property. It is therefore essential to distinguish between appearances which 
correspond to reality and those which do not and are deceptive.20
From this standpoint the structure of law is not preestablished but created 
ad hoc through construction (interpretation) depending on the pragmatic and 
other goals of lawyers, judges and members of a legal community engaged in 
interpretative practices.21 there can be as many reconstructions of this structure as 
there are various goals, practical situations and normative solutions. to claim that 
a statement of proposition has a binding force, or, in other words, to admit that 
any of these reconstructions has an objective meaning, one has to connect it with 
a hypothetical presupposition (be it Grundnorm or rule of recognition, or any other 
axiomatic normative entity) or to state its necessary congruence with the reality 
which per se reveals the binding force (be it laws of universe, laws of nature, rules 
of social solidarity, divine or human reason, etc.). In any case, the result will be the 
same: a proposition acquires its binding force, but the connection link can lead to 
two sorts of appearances: fictive22 or real (always to a certain degree).
19  See on it reza Banakar, Integrating Reciprocal Perspectives: On Georges Gurvitch’s Theory of Immediate 
Jural Experience, 16(1) Can. J.L. & soc. (2001), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_
id=1777167> (accessed Jul. 28, 2015).
20  Chaïm Perelman, the realm of rhetoric 126–27 (william kluback, trans.) (university of Notre dame 
Press 1982).
21  Alexander Peczenik admitted that the legal dogmatists can be more disposed to holistic interpre-
tation than the pragmatically minded judges, but this is the matter of degree and not of principle 
(Alexander Peczenik, Jumps and Logic in the Law. What Can One Expect from Logical Models of Legal 
Argumentation?, in Logical Models of Legal Argumentation 141, 147 (henry Prakken & giovanni 
sartor, eds.) (kluwer 1997)).
22  the use of the term ‘fictive’ in this aspect means ‘non-posited’ and does not imply that the corresponding 
entities (as physiological projections or rational beliefs) are inexistent or false.
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3. Fictitious Character of the Systemacity Claim
our assertion here is that in the realm of law there can be no appearances 
(notions, institutes, principles . . .) fully congruent with reality. different legal schemes 
and conceptions allow for various degrees of such congruence, but some of them 
analytically require full congruence. Among such conceptions is that of systemacity 
of law.23 Constructing the structure of law is a logical operation and does not imply 
any isomorphism with facts, with norms or with values (all these are finally a result of 
interpretation) – its main criterion can be solely logical coherence. with a view to this 
criterion, one can evaluate the pertinence and practicality of various interpretations 
(schemes, structures) and choose that which seems to be the best for the particular 
goals of a legal scholar or practitioner.
As MacCormick and weinberger insisted,24 law is not a set of natural (or, as they 
expressed themselves, ‘brute’) facts that can be inspected directly. rather, it is an 
‘institutional fact’ setting out a scheme of interpretation25 under which certain 
acts acquire a special meaning. that is why, according to MacCormick, such facts 
are dependent on human activity. that assignment of meaning to a social fact (i.e. 
a speech or a behavioral act) depends on the scheme of collective intentionality 
in general,26 and, for the sphere of law, on frameworks of legal reasoning in each 
particular legal community.27 And, as wittgenstein explains, there are no facts that 
determine meaning. Neither do interpretations: ‘Any interpretation still hangs in the 
air along with what it interprets, and cannot give any support. Interpretations by 
themselves do not determine meaning.’28 In order to construct law as an object of 
interpretation, MacCormick introduces the conception of institution that characterizes 
some norms as a bundle of interconnected rights, obligations, principles and values 
in which a legal idea resonates in relation to other legal ideas which lawyers use 
to justify their decisions.29 From this vantage point, ‘law as a system’ signifies that 
the legal community creates the institutional reality, which individuals can use to 
embed their arguments and concepts, to entwine them into a coherent fabric of 
legal reasoning. It is worth repeating that the reconstruction of the structure of law 
23  there are several other conceptions such as natural law, but their analysis falls out of the scope of 
the present paper.
24  Neil MacCormick & ota weinberger, An Institutional theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal 
Positivism (d. reidel Pub. 1986).
25  to think about the depiction of law as a scheme of interpretation (Deutungsschema) in Pure theory 
of Law!
26  John r. searle, the social Construction of reality 46 (Penguin 1995).
27  Julius stone, Legal system and Lawyers’ reasonings (stanford university Press 1964).
28  Ludwig wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 198 (wiley-Blackwell 2009).
29  MacCormick & weinberger, supra n. 24, at 49–74.
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is not subject to the criterion of veracity,30 and no condition of isomorphism is to 
be met here.31
the features of legal order are based on assumptions related to either the 
cognitivist or the non-cognitivist approach. surely, if we follow a cognitivist 
approach and subscribe to a certain philosophy of absolute values (be it a version 
of iusnaturalism or another non-positivist philosophy of law), and if among these 
values there is a value of order or coherence, then the thesis of systemacity of law 
turns out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy: law is systemic as systemacity is its intrinsic 
value. or, which is analytically similar, the law of the country is a system, insofar as it 
is structured by the constitution which describes this law as a system. these theses 
will be true within the given framework of references, but they will be desperately 
trivial. If, following the tenets of iuspositivism, we assume a non-cognitivist position, 
this makes it impossible to consider systemacity in terms of true and false. only 
descriptive facts can be proven descriptively; evaluative facts are dependent on 
defining their values and characteristics. given that no legal order is systemic 
(absolutely consistent, gapless and irredundant), the assertion of systemacity can 
bear only on the evaluative dimension of law which is highly controversial for those 
who do not subscribe to a metaphysical philosophy.32
while a lawyer intellectually reestablishes the structure of law, coherence is 
established not between norms33 but between propositions which describe norms 
or values; a description of these realities (norms and propositions) requires diverse 
normative and logical tools. thence, logical coherence does not require finding 
a value consensus (axiological hierarchy, ‘the best interpretation’ . . .) or returning 
to an ultimate source of validity (e.g., a basic norm) – a logical description can be 
coherent if it consistently sticks to the same criteria. A description is valid if it has 
binding force in the given circumstances (e.g., formulated by a judge or an officer 
within their competences), but in this case it ceases to be descriptive and becomes 
normative. As an example, the concept ‘universe’ serves as a conventional criterion to 
30  At least, in terms of the substantive truth theories, such as correspondence or coherence theories, 
the question about other theories of truth deserves a special research.
31  some theories can, however, insist on isomorphism. Like that of the Finnish philosopher kaarle 
Makkonen who based his theory of legal reasoning on the logical primacy of an isomorphic relation 
between descriptions of facts, the one as given in a legal norm and the other as (possibly) existing in 
the world (kaarle Makkonen, Zur Problematik der juridischen Entscheidung: eine strukturanalytische 
studie (turun yliopisto 1965)). Even in this theory, which uses wittgenstein’s philosophy as a point of 
reference, we can see that isomorphism is not an absolute requirement of congruence with reality.
32  Jerzy wróblewski, the Judicial Application of Law 137–49 (Zenon Bańkowski & Neil MacCormick, 
eds.) (kluwer 1992).
33  Norms can be understood as deontic entities whose validity is exempt from the criterion of 
veracity, according to the famous distinction between norms, normative statements and normative 
propositions introduced by g.h. von wright (georg h. von wright, Norm and Action: A Logical Enquiry 
(routledge & kegan Paul; the humanities Press 1963)).
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unite norms according to the ideas of ‘Normative systems.’34 According to this logic, 
legal systems are subjective constructions – they can be fixed in a constitution or 
in other normative acts, and thus obtain binding force (e.g., description of sources 
of law in a procedural code which binds judges so that they are not empowered 
to justify their decisions with reference to other sources), or can remain within the 
dogmatic province (rather with recommendation force). In the first case, a logical 
description turns into a rule of law and changes its nature; in the second, and similar 
cases, its subjective nature remains intact (unless the doctrine has normative value 
in the respective legal community).
when we look at legal systems in the way Alchourrón and Bulygin do, the 
description of law as of a legal system implies that each set of norms (of normative 
propositions) is described with a view to all its logical sequences.35 In this logic, the 
basic element for constructing a legal system (for ‘systematization of law’) is a set of 
norms. there can be different sets composed of the same norms, so that thinking 
of law as a system does not analytically require accepting that law is a whole – 
thinking legal systems (in a certain sense) are possible even when abandoning the 
idea of systemacity (unity, harmony, integrity). Coherence is only a contingent matter 
for the law.36 Let us suppose that there are several sets of norms which are valid 
within a certain territory, are backed with the coercive force of the same political 
community, stem from the same constitution, etc. It is analytically possible that all 
these norms be described with reference to the same criteria (are described within 
the framework of the same ‘universes’). In this case, the reconstructed legal system 
will include all the valid norms. In the legal parlance, this analytical possibility is 
usually meant when referring to a ‘legal system’ (unity of sources of law, of all the valid 
norms, of all legal processes . . .). however, such a complete system is not analytically 
or practically necessary, as there can be incomplete descriptions (interpretations, 
structures) which stick to the same criteria and in this sense are logical descriptions, 
but which are not conclusive or coherent. Moreover, law enforcement does not 
require that all the valid norms be interpreted into a coherent and whole unity in 
order to have binding force.37 on the contrary, incoherence is implied in technically 
developed legal communities which usually provide for conflict rules – like that of 
lex posterior derogat legi priori.
34  Alchourrón & Bulygin, supra n. 2.
35  there can be other criteria but they do not yield a ‘system’ logically speaking and are therefore 
irrelevant for this discussion.
36  Eugenio Bulygin, Objectivity of Law in the View of Legal Positivism, in Analisi e diritto 2004. ricerche 
di giurisprudenza analitica 219 (Paolo Comanducci & riccardo guastini, eds.) (giappichelli 2005), 
available at <http://www.giuri.unige.it/intro/dipist/digita/filo/testi/analisi_2004/15bulygin.pdf> 
(accessed Jul. 28, 2015).
37  Frederic schauer, Playing by the rules: A Philosophical Examination of rules-Based decisions-Making 
in Law and in Life 164 (Clarendon Press 1991).
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taken in this sense, a legal system can be differentiated from a legal order, 
which is a chain of empowerments (competences). According to hans kelsen, the 
former is a description with no normative value (forming no source of validity or 
empowerment); the latter serves as a base for lawmaking and law enforcement, 
and therefore has normative value (being a source of validity).38 however, both 
‘system’ and ‘order’ are intellectual reconstructions but with different sequences. 
unlike a legal system, a legal order should be interpreted into a logically coherent 
whole – otherwise the chain of validity (empowerments) would be broken. From 
this standpoint, (partial) systemacity of law has a normative and not ontological 
character: rules of law can be binding only insofar as they belong (or are interpreted 
as belonging) to a legal order. At the same time, nothing guarantees that a particular 
rule will in fact be interpreted as belonging to the order and / or as having a certain 
place in it – because of the intrinsically dynamic character of legal order.
systemacity of law, seen in the kelsenian perspective,39 is a function of normativity 
of law: legal rules are interpreted as if (als ob) they enter into a legal order (because 
they stem from the same basic norm, the rule of recognition, issued by the same 
political power, etc.). this scheme of interpretation is nothing but an intellectual 
reconstruction which usually remains subjective, and which can pretend to be 
objective only insofar as some objective grounds of normativity (e.g., an obligation 
to follow rules of law) are introduced. It can be asserted that there is no isomorphism, 
but identity between the object of interpretation and the results of interpretation 
(interpretation in this context can mean both normative and logical reconstruction), 
as here the object is created through interpretation and is tantamount to its results. 
Admitting that interpretation and reconstruction are of the same nature and yield the 
same results, one can conclude that ‘law as a system’ appears only a posteriori: after 
but not before the appropriate act of thinking (of interpretation or reconstruction). 
then, to invest this act with any normative or truth value means to ascribe such an act 
to a kind of objective authority (practical reason, etc.). however, from the analytical 
standpoint, such an act can be conceived of as a purely intellectual construction 
with no binding force.
this gives us sound grounds to assume that, when thinking about ‘systems’ in 
law, one can abandon the idea of an objective unity of law which presupposes 
isomorphism between a ‘systematic interpretation’ of law (which constructs a legal 
order) and the facts (texts, acts . . .) which are thus interpreted. In legal philosophy, 
this isomorphism is a consequence of postulating an axiomatic base of normativity or 
of truth which bridges a connecting link between a deontic prescription and a state 
of affairs (e.g., insomuch as law should be obeyed, law is a system of the obeying 
38  See Michael s. green, Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems, 53(2) Ala. L. rev. (2003), available 
at <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1172&context=facpubs> (accessed 
Jul. 27, 2015).
39  kelsen utilizes the term ‘system’ as synonymous to the term ‘order.’
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behavior or the interpretations which depict law as something to be obeyed are 
true). Legal propositions can be interpreted by various actors into logically coherent 
systems without there being any analytical need (there can be a need of ideological 
or speculative character) to integrate these systems into one whole system. the legal 
interpretation of facts is a different question as facts are not interpreted (neither 
logically, nor normatively) but qualified through connecting them with a legal rule. 
Anyway, there is no need to interpret facts as belonging to a legal whole in order 
to qualify them as legally relevant. such qualification can, however, reinforce the 
obligation to obey the law: if a legal subject under certain circumstances entwined 
into the fabric of the law is bound to act in the prescribed way, then subjectivity is 
limited by the objective qualities of the system (into which rules, facts, principles, 
and practices are integrated). referring to the ‘systemacity of law’ can then have 
a similar function to kelsen’s Grundnorm, which sets forth that we can comprehend 
law when we look at it as if there was a basic norm which serves as a base of validity.40 
kelsen reiterates:
Along with the basic norm, presupposed in thought, one must also think 
of an imaginary authority whose (figmentary) act of will has the basic norm 
as its meaning. with this fiction, the assumption that the constitution, whose 
validity is grounded by the basic norm, is the meaning of an act of will of 
a supreme authority, over which there can be no higher authority. thus the 
basic norm becomes a genuine fiction in the sense of Vaihinger’s philosophy 
of ‘as if.’ A fiction in this sense is characterized by its not only contradicting 
reality but also containing contradiction within itself.41
In this sense we could speak about law as a system; however, keeping in mind 
that this systemacity (like Grundnorm) is a fiction (in the later version of kelsen’s Pure 
theory of Law inspired by Vaihinger’s Als-Ob Philosophy) which has nothing to do 
with reality and rather contradicts reality:
the cognitive goal of the Basic Norm is to ground the validity of the norms 
forming a positive moral or legal order, that is, to interpret the subjective 
meaning of the norm-positing acts as their objective meaning (i.e. as valid 
norms) and to interpret the relevant acts as norm-positing acts. this goal can 
40  ‘Insofar as only the presupposition of the basic norm makes it possible to interpret the subjective 
meaning of the constitution-creating act (and of the acts established according to the constitution) as 
their objective meaning, that is, as objectively valid norms, the basic norm as represented by the 
science of law may be characterized as the transcendental-logical condition of this interpretation’ (hans 
kelsen, the Pure theory of Law 202 (Max knight, trans.) (university of California Press 1967) [hereinafter 
kelsen, the Pure theory]).
41  hans kelsen, The Function of a Constitution, in Essays on kelsen (richard tur & william twining, eds.) 117 
(Clarendon Press 1986).
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be attained only by means of a fiction . . . A fiction differs from a hypothesis in 
that it is accompanied – or thought to be accompanied – by the awareness 
that reality does not agree with it.42
4. Conclusion
the approach which has been proposed in the foregoing seems to be the only way 
to argue that law possesses some systemic qualities, i.e. that it is a pure fiction utilized 
by lawyers to describe law in the terms of the legal thinking of Modernity, and through 
appealing to ‘systemacity’ to call for more rationality in law. the juristic method consists 
of the following: in order to be interpreted as legal, rules and norms are intellectually 
connected within a legal community into a legal order as into a normatively (more or 
less) coherent whole. this method reveals certain utility, especially in the ideological 
dimension, but we should not forget that there is no isomorphism between legal 
order and legal system(s) as they represent results of different reconstructions 
(normative for the former, logical for the latter). the ‘systematization of law’ can be 
performed on the base of elementary logical connections between norms and their 
sequences. From this standpoint, ‘systematization’ does not depend on how the legal 
order to which these norms belong is structured, as this structuring has a dynamic 
character and reveals itself in constant process of (re)interpretation.43 At the same 
time, ‘systemacity’ is a hypothesis presupposed as a condition of establishing logical 
connections – evidently, not all acts of interpretation in reality are based on this 
presupposition. therefore, this presupposition of ‘systemacity’ is contingent on the 
purposes of various actors; it can serve some of these purposes (when one needs to 
prove that a certain interpretation is not acceptable as it does not fit ‘the integrity of 
law’ . . .) but not necessarily all purposes. Also, there is no systemacity or law in the 
sense of objective qualities of the legal material (facts, texts, behavior, and norms) – 
such qualities can be attributed to law through interpretation which pursues different 
normative, ideological, speculative or other purposes, which inevitably brings 
subjectivity into any interpretation. It can be said that these qualities exist only in 
the specific sense of the existence of legal norms (their validity, in the terms of kelsen), 
but do not exist in the ordinary (ontological) sense of factual being.
to better reassess the ‘systemic’ way lawyers think about law (as something whole, 
integrated, coherent . . .), one can consider the difference between the normative and 
logical reconstructions of law. this difference shows that a lawyer can at the same 
time perceive law as an order (in the normative sense – as of a continuous network of 
empowerments) and as a plurality. In the logical sense it will signify that organizing 
42  hans kelsen, general theory of Norms 256 (Michael hartney, trans.) (Clarendon Press 1991). 
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.001.0001
43  this, according to kelsen, signifies that a legal order is reconstructed each time one creates, interprets, 
and applies legal norms (kelsen, the Pure theory, supra n. 40, at 193 ff.).
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parts of the law into ‘legal systems’ will allow for different logical sequences from 
the same normative sets or for the same factual situations. Law does not represent 
a factual unity or a coherent whole (in the ontological sense) but it can be interpreted 
as if it were united and coherent in order to attribute binding force to the rules of 
law (for kelsen, it means to attribute an objective meaning to these rules) and to 
reinforce the ideological postulate that law shall be obeyed.
Adopting this point of view, there is nothing contradictory in thinking of a set 
of norms as a ‘system,’ stripping this term of the properties (such as completeness, 
consistency, or irredundance) usually attributed to a ‘system’ in logic, in linguistic, 
and in exact sciences.44 we then have a ‘system(s) of law’ which is (are) only 
relatively integrated and identified.45 this could be a point of tangency where legal, 
linguistic and logic theory can effectively work together describing from different 
methodological viewpoints on how law is integrated. this approach seems to be 
quite reconcilable with the basic idea of ‘Normative systems’ by Alchourrón-Bulygin – 
the idea that all the normative sets can be imagined as independent entities, united 
solely by (more or less) the logical reasoning of judges, law-enforcement officers 
and law professors, and that there can be as many such normative systems as there 
are actors reasoning about the law and systematizing the legal propositions (and 
consequently, the norms contained in these propositions).46
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Neil MacCormick, eds.) (kluwer 1992).
Acknowledgments
the research for this article (grant No. 14-01-0022) was supported by the National 
research university – higher school of Economics’ Academic Fund Program in 
2014–15.
Information about the author
Mikhail Antonov (St. Petersburg, Russia) – Associate Professor at department 
of theory and history of Law and state, National research university – higher school 
of Economics (16 soyuza Pechatnikov str., st. Petersburg, 190121, russia; e-mail: 
mantonov@hse.ru).
